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For 12 years Vasiliy Mitrokhin, a senior archivist in charge of the KGB’s
foreign-intelligence archive, surreptitiously copied top-secret documents and
assembled a clandestine archive of his own. It documented the crimes against the
Soviet people perpetrated by the Soviet system and more particularly by the
KGB, crimes which had distressed Mitrokhin so profoundly when he read of
them that he resolved to expose them at any cost. As he labored to achieve his
goal he would live in constant fear of discovery but always with the hope that
somehow he would manage ultimately to escape to the West with his massive
archive and turn it over to the CIA.
When the time arrived, however, the CIA rebuffed him(!), and instead it
was British intelligence that exfilitrated Mitrokhin and his family, along with his
archive, which MI6 is reportedly sharing with other Western intelligence servic-
es.
The first book based on material from the Mitrokhin archive was The
Sword and the Shield (1999), co-authored by Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew,
a Cambridge University historian who specializes in Soviet intelligence and who
also worked with an earlier KGB defector, Oleg Gordievsky.  A vast hodgepodge
of revelations, both major and minor, it addresses some of the issues and events
about which Mitrokhin felt a pressing urgency to make public, among them the
regime’s treatment of the dissidents, the Cold War period, the harassment of
Boris Pasternak, the crushing of the Prague Spring, and the Soviet war in
Afghanistan. 
KGB Lexicon is quite different – literally, in its substance, a dictionary of
KGB terminology. On the most superficial level it provides names for all the dis-
crete acts involved in espionage as it was conducted by the KGB. Its true value,
however, lies in what may be inferred from the definitions, for they readily yield
the procedural guidelines to be followed by intelligence officer – the rulebook,
as Peter Hennessy puts it, that allows access to the KGB’s inner mind – to the
values, attitudes, and principles by which the KGB operated.  The KGB itself
recognized the lexicon’s importance in this regard. Copies were numbered and
their circulation was strictly controlled.
Entries in the version prepared by Mitrokhin are sorted into two sections,
as is the KGB original: intelligence and counter-intelligence. Headwords are in
transliterated Russian followed by an English translation. Here are two exam-
ples:
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Metod spetsialnogo pozitivnogo vozdeystviya –
the method of special positive pressure
A method of conducting active measures used by KGB external
Intelligence in order to exert influence on governments, parties, or individual
political and public figures by carrying out measures of various forms and con-
tent through agents and confidential contacts within the legal framework of the
target country. 
Deystvuyushchiy rezerv – the active reserve
A special KGB cadre comprising intelligence officers who are sent out to
work in foreign countries, or within the Soviet Union, under cover of various
institutions.
The index, also, is divided into two sections, one listing transliterated
Russian headwords and the other listing the headwords in English. If one were
to wish for a third index it would be for a conventional topical listing, which
would more readily identify categories and facilitate the discovery of connec-
tions and the making of generalizations.
To complain of a flaw of this nature, however, seems petty as one brows-
es these pages from Mitrokhin’s Archive, filled with information that was classi-
fied as top secret even within the organization that produced it.
In the beginning, Mitrokhin was a good communist. In this sense perhaps
he is still a good communist; but at his advanced age, when he speaks of com-
munism in positive terms he is recalling the earliest years of the Soviet period,
when “[t]he Bolshevik Revolution began by robbing and wiping out a wealthy
minority in the interests of a poor majority,” and before it “ended by robbing and
humiliating the poor majority in favor of a new criminal wealthy minority.”
”The Cheka,” he says, having “metamorphosed into the fighting unit of
hard-core nationalism built on political intrigue, is now in the service of the nou-
veaux riches, the bankers, capitalists and exploiters, waiting hand and foot on the
Mafiosi class of oligarchs.”
The old order is no more, to be sure, but the Chekists typically are not
among the victims of such quiet transitions, nor were they extirpated in the
weeks that followed the end of the Soviet system. Most of them have simply
changed their uniforms and put away the old red ribbons; one of them, notably,
has become Russia’s president.
So, as Mitrokhin remarks, although it might seem that a new order would
have no reason to retain secret documents from its predecessor, this one does not
appear inclined to throw open its archives. Nor does Mitrokhin expect it to do so.
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